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Comment: The Pretrial Probable Cause Hearing
in Minnesota
Rule 11 of the recently adopted Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure' provides an omnibus hearing in felony and gross misdemeanor cases for a defendant who does not plead guilty at his
initial appearance before the district court. The omnibus hearing
combines the Rasmussen hearing, 2 the hearing on pretrial
motions of the defense and prosecution, and the hearing on other
pretrial issues raised by the court.4 The greatest controversy
over the consolidated proceedings has concerned what procedures
the courts should employ in ruling on a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause.3 Prosecutors have argued that the rule should be interpreted to require
the court to review only the complaint and its attachments, such
as police reports, and to do so without adversary presentations. 6
Defense counsel, on the other hand, have argued that protection
of the defendant from the burdens of an unjustified trial requires
that the probable cause hearing include the "full panoply of adversary safeguards," including counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses. 7 Before the
1. See In re Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, Order of the

Supreme Court of Minnesota, 299 Minn. (unnumbered page) (1974).

2. Musx. R. Cmm. P. 11.02. The Rasmussen hearing, named for

the case in which it was initiated, State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash,
272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1965), provided for pretrial disposition of
constitutional challenges to the admissibility of evidence.
3. MAnr. R. CRmu. P. 11.03.
4. Id 11.04. This rule provides:
The court shall ascertain any other constitutional, evidentiary,

procedural or other issues that may be heard or disposed of before trial and such other matters as will promote a fair and ex-

peditious trial, and shall hear and determine them, or continue
the hearing for that purpose.
5. Rule 11.03 provides:
The court shall hear and determine all motions made by the
defendant or prosecution, including a motion that there is an msufficient showing of probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the complaint, and receive
such evidence as may be offered in support or opposition. Each
party may cross-examine any witnesses produced by the other.
A finding by the court of probable cause shall be based upon
the entire record including reliable hearsay in whole or in part.
Evidence considered on the issue of probable cause shall be sub-

ject to the requirements of Rule 18.06, subd. 1.
6. See State v. Jarvis, No. 27694 (Minn. Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct.
1975); State v. Franek, No. 27695 (Minn. Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. 1975).
7. Cf. State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892, 896-900 (Minn. 1976).
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rules were adopted, the Supreme Court of Minnesota required
that probable cause be determined at "a hearing in a substantial
sense,"8 a position approximating that advocated by defense
counsel. But in a recent interpretation of rule 11, the court affirmed a district court's denial of a felony defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of probable cause, holding that where the defendant fails at the omnibus hearing to produce witnesses who,
if believed, would exonerate him, a court may find there is probable cause to bind him over for trial without conducting an adversary proceeding. State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892 (Minn.
1976).
The preliminary hearing is a judicial proceeding held shortly
after the accused is arrested to determine whether the prosecutor's case against him is sufficient to justify his further detention.9 The modern functions of this proceeding have been to
protect the defendant from the humiliation and anxiety of an
unjustified public prosecution, to save the state and the defendant unnecessary expense, and to enable the defense to discover
the prosecution's case. 10 All states and the federal government
employ the preliminary hearing in some form, although the jurisdictions vary in their treatment of the evidentiary burden the
prosecutor must sustain in order to have the accused bound over
for trial and the rules of evidence with which the prosecutor
must comply; the extent to which the defendant may introduce
his own witnesses or confront and cross-examine those testifying
against him; and the role of the presiding magistrate in evaluating the credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence. 1
The variations turn upon the extent to which the preliminary
hearing must serve the function of providing the defendant with
8. Id. at 895-98.
9. The modern preliminary hearing differs substantially from its
historical counterpart. Originally, this proceeding was established for
the benefit of the prosecution, the two primary functions being "inquisition and prevention of indiscriminate releasing of prisoners." Anderson,
The Preliminary Hearing-BetterAlternatives or More of the Same? 35
Mo. L. REv. 281, 284 (1970). The hearing developed relatively recently
into a procedure to protect the accused from illegal detention. Id. at 285.
See also Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid
the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal
Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1361, 1365-70 (1969); Note, The
Function of the Preliminary Hearing inFederal PretrialProcedure, 83
YALE L.J. 771 (1974).
10. Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922); see
Y. KAzmSAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRnVIINAL PROCEDURE 957
(4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
11. MODERN CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, supranote 10, at 958.
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information necessary to his defense. 1 2 Thus, courts have held
that where the defendant is entitled to extensive discovery before
trial, those aspects of the pretrial hearing that do no more than
provide him this same information need not be duplicated. 13
Before adoption of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused enjoyed extensive participation in the preliminary probable cause hearing. The statute governing this
proceeding provided that the defendant, assisted by counsel,
could examine his own witnesses and cross-examine those testifying for the prosecution, and that the magistrate was to examine
the prosecution's complaint and witnesses in the presence of the
accused.'4 The statute did not specify the evidentiary burden
the prosecutor must sustain to have the accused bound over for
trial or the rules governing the production of the state's evidence.
In Hastings v. Bailey'; the Minnesota supreme court held that
the state did not have to disclose all of its evidence relating to
the commission of the offense at the preliminary hearing.'6
The court defined the probable cause standard as "evidence
worthy of consideration, in any aspect for the judicial mind to
act upon, bring[ing] the charge against the prisoner within
reasonable probability.""7 In many cases, however, despite reci-

12. Id. at 958-60. See also F. MILLER, PROSECUTION 45-149 (1969);
Note, supra note 9, at 773 n.7.
13. See, e.g., Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1199 (D.C. Cir.
1973).

14. Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, § 5244 (codified as MIN. STAT. § 629.50
(1974) ) provided:
The magistrate before whom any person shall be brought upon

a charge of having committed an offense shall, as soon as may
be, examine the complainant and the witnesses in support of the
prosecution, on oath, in the presence of the party charged, in
relation to any pertinent matter connected with such charge,
after which the witnesses for the prisoner, if he has any, shall
be sworn and examined, and he may be assisted by counsel in
such examination, and also in the cross-examination of the witnesses in support of the prosecution.
15. 263 Minn. 261, 116 N.W.2d 548 (1962).
16. Id. at 266, 116 N.W.2d at 551.
17. Id. (citing State ex rel Wojtycski v. Hanley, 248 Wis. 108, 111,
20 N.W.2d 719, 720 (1945)). In State v. Clark, 270 Minn. 538, 558, 134
N.W.2d 857, 871 (1965), the court held that "[alll that is required at a
preliminary hearing is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause;
that is, that a crime has been committed and that defendant probably
has committed it." And in State ex rel. Jeffrey v. Tessmer, 211 Minn.
55, 56, 300 N.W. 7, 8 (1941), the court held that a finding of probable
cause could be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,
although such evidence alone would not support a conviction. See
Mi=N. STAT. § 634.04 (1974) (not superseded by the rules):
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice,
unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to con-
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tations of this lower standard for evaluating the evidence offered
to bind over a defendant for trial, the same evidence presented
at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt had been used
at the preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.' 8 Since
the statute governing preliminary bearings permitted the accused
to cross-examine the witnesses testifying against him,19 the production of evidence similar to thait to be used at trial provided
the defendant an opportunity to conduct rigorous cross-examination by which he could thoroughly test the strength of the prosecution's case.
Rule 11.03 superseded the statute previously governing the
preliminary hearing. Consistent with the consolidation of pretrial motions and other pretrial proceedings, this rule replaces the
preliminary hearing with a motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of probable cause at the omnibus hearing. 20 Rule 11.03
permits "[e] ach party [t] o cross-exmnine any witnesses produced
by the other," and, by reference to rule 18.06(1), requires the
determination of probable cause to be "based on substantial evidence that would be admissible at trial"--a standard apparently
at least as strict as that read into the predecessor statute by the
Minnesota supreme court. 21 Nonetheless in State v. Florence
vict the defendant of the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission
of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
18. Hastings v. Bailey, 263 Minn. 261, 116 N.W.2d 598 (1962), frequently cited for the proposition that "any evidence worthy of consideration" is acceptable to establish probable cause, involved the purchase of
cattle with a forged check. The evidence used at the preliminary hearing to prove felonious intent included testimony by the former owner
of the cattle, and evidence that the cattle were immediately resold after
the purchase. The same evidence was used to convict the defendant at
trial. This parity in the level of proof was also present in State ex rel.
Krinkie v. Felix, 171 Minn. 140, 213 N.W. 556 (1927) (testimony of a
minor to whom intoxicating beverages were illegally sold); and in In
'e Snell, 31 Minn. 110, 16 N.W. 692 (1885) (testimony of all witnesses
heard at trial identical to their written statements introduced at the preliminary hearing).
19. See note 14 supra.
20. In its syllabus, the supreme court in State v. Florence, 239
N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1976), stated that "[t]he preliminary hearing previously required by Minn. St. 629.50 became obsolete when the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted." Of course, the only
obsolete characteristic of the old procedure is the manner in which it
was instituted; whereas under the old procedure the defendant filed a
request for a hearing, under the new procedure the defendant moves
to dismiss for lack of probable cause. The consequences of winning or
losing-discharge or bindover for trial-axe the same.
21. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. Rule 11.03, quoted
in note 5 supra, states that evidence considered on the issue of prob-
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the court interpreted rule 11.03 as lowering the burden of proof
imposed by the statute and dispensing with cross-examination
in most cases. The court held that where the defendant does
not produce a witness, "who, if believed, would exonerate him"
the "entire record" need only include "[a] carefully drawn and
sufficiently detailed complaint made by an investigating officer
22
Only in the "rare case" 28
and incorporating reliable hearsay.1
where the defendant produces witnesses in support of his motion
to dismiss may adversary proceedings, including cross-examination, be conducted. The judge must then base his decision on
evidence adequate to support denial of a motion for a directed
24
verdict of acquittal.
As its principal rationale for avoiding adversary proceedings
in most cases, the court observed that the probable cause hearing
is no longer needed as a discovery device: "The broad discovery
permitted under the rules as adopted should make it possible
in most cases to achieve the discovery functions of a formal preliminary hearing without exhausting appearances of witnesses
prior to trial and extensive pretrial adversary proceedings before
a judge."25 The Minnesota rules, however, contain no provisions for discovering the prosecution's case by cross-examining
its witnesses. Rule 9 provides for discovery by the defendant
of the names and addresses of witnesses for the prosecution 26
and any statements previously made by them concerning the
able cause is subject to rule 18.06(1), which provides, in relevant part,
that "[a]n indictment shall be based on substantial evidence that would
be admissible at trial." The rule excepts six categories of evidence
from the exclusionary rules employed at trial: hearsay evidence offered
only to lay the foundation for otherwise admissible evidence; reports by
experts concerning the results of examinations or tests used in the investigation; unauthenticated copies of official records; written sworn
statements of persons claiming ownership in property or attesting to its
value; written sworn statements of unavailable witnesses; and oral or
written summaries made by investigating officers of the contents of documents examined but not produced at the hearing. MIN. R. CRm. P.
18.06(1).
The supreme court in Florence held that "substantial evidence admissible at trial," in the few cases where this standard applies, see text
accompanying note 24 infra,constitutes "evidence adequate to support denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal." 239 N.W.2d at 902
n.21.
22. 239 N.W.2d at 902.
23. Id. at 900.
24. Id. at 902 n.21.
25. Id. at 899-900. The court noted that it was rejecting a trend
in some jurisdictions to use the preliminary hearing as an independent
means to discover the prosecution's case. Id. at 897-98.
26. AMnm R. Cmn. P. 9.01(1) (1).
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case.2 7 Rule 21 governs depositions, the closest equivalent to the
opportunity for cross-examination that would otherwise be available in a formal preliminary hearing. Under this rule, parties
may depose witnesses only where there is a "reasonable probability" that their testimony will be used at a hearing or trial and
then only where the witness is or will be unavailable at trial.28
Where the witness is within the jurisdiction of the court and
free from physical or mental affliction, as is undoubtedly true
in the overwhelming majority of cases, depositions are not permitted.29 Both the separation of this provision from the discovery procedures in rule 9 and the strict conditions limiting its
use indicate that deposition was intended to preserve testimony,
rather than to discover the strength of the prosecution's case
through cross-examination. 30 By prohibiting cross-examination
in the preliminary hearing for all but those defendants who produce exonerating witnesses, Florence appears to have eliminated
this discovery tool entirely, rather than merely relegating its use
to earlier procedures, as the court seems to have intended.31
Even were courts to broadly construe the discovery provisions of rule 9 and the apparently narrow deposition procedure
of rule 21 to permit vigorous cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses before the omnibus hearing, tactical considerations militate against using these discovery tools to test the
strength of the prosecution's case,12 In cross-examining opposing witnesses for discovery purposes, the defendant seeks to
collect as much information as possible so that he can intelligently prepare his case. 33 He also seeks to test the prosecution's
case against him, so that he can plead intelligently. Commentators have observed, however, that these two goals are often
incompatible, for if at the discovery stage the defendant attempts
to test the prosecution's case through vigorous questioning, the
27. Id.

28. Id. 21.01.
29. See id. 21.01, .06(1).

30. The comment to rule 9 supporls this conclusion. The first sen-

tence outlines the "comprehensive method of discovery" provided by the

new rules. While this outline contains references to several other rules,
it contains none to rule 21. Most states provide criminal depositions solely for preservation of testimony (as opposed to discovery) purposes. ABA STIMxARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFronP
TPAIL 84 (Approved Draft, 1970).
31. 239 N.W.2d at 900.
32. See Hearings on S. 34745.945, Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) at 133.

33. Id.
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witness is likely to respond reluctantly and sparingly. 34 In that
event, the defendant would be left without sufficient information
to prepare his defense. If, on the other hand, the defendant were
able to thoroughly cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses
after discovery at a preliminary hearing, he could reserve vigorous questioning for the latter proceeding and thus achieve both
of his objectives. Florence represents an attempt to eliminate
the duplication of procedures that would result if a defendant
were afforded both discovery and a preliminary hearing. Although preservation of both proceedings requires the prosecution's witnesses to testify twice before trial, discovery alone is
ill suited to accomplishing the defendant's pretrial objectives.
Thus, by eliminating the pretrial hearing in most cases, the court
has forced the defendant to a difficult choice. He must either
pose questions designed to elicit the most cooperation from witnesses, in the hope that by so doing he will build his case, or
thoroughly examine them and risk their recalcitrance in order
to reach an informed pleading decision. While the Florence court
correctly recognized the importance to defendants of thoroughly
testing the evidence against them, the court mistakenly concluded that this could be effectively accomplished in discovery
proceedings.
One approach to preserving at least some opportunity for
pretrial cross-examination might be to broadly construe the
court's definition of witnesses "who, if believed, would exonerate
the defendant."3 5 According to the court, presentation of such
witnesses by the defendant in support of his motion to dismiss
entitles him to adversary procedures in the probable cause hearing.36 Conceivably, if the testimony of a witness for the prosecu34.

A. AmSTEmAm, TRiL MA

AL FOR THE DEFENSE oF CurmnvAL

CASES § 139 (3d ed. 1974). Professor Amsterdam states:
Frequently counsel may find that he is working at cross-purposes in seeking to discover and to lay a foundation for impeachment simultaneously....

If he vigorously cross-exam-

ines the witness, in an effort to get a contradiction or concession
on record, the witness will normally dig in and give a minimum
of information in an effort to save his testimonial position ....
Id. at 1-124.
35. 239 N.W.2d at 902.
36. Id. While this position seems to assume that the defendant will
be unable to call prosecution witnesses, neither the court nor rule 11.03
explicitly restricts the defendant in this way. The technique of calling
adverse witnesses in a preliminary hearing was approved in Coleman
v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Washington v. Clem-

mer, 339 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
circumstances by Professor Amsterdam.

It is recommended in certain
A. AzST=DAm, TRAL MANUAL
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tion constituted an indispensable element of the state's case, the

defendant could "exonerate" himself by impugning the reliability
of this testimony through vigorous, cross-examination.3 7 Neither
the supreme court in Florencenor any other precedent expressly

forecloses this strategy in the preliminary hearing;3 8 moreover,

this approach is consistent with the well-settled principle allowing the defendant to call adverse witnesses at trial.3 9 However,
this construction of the class of witnesses that will trigger adversary proceedings unfortunately appears inconsistent with the
holding in Florence. Witnesses who, if believed, would exonerate
the defendant will seldom include witnesses for the state, since
the defendant in most cases can avoid culpability only by challenging the credibility of their testimony. Thus the court appears
to have contemplated an adversary hearing only where the defendant produces his own witness, such as a witness who places
the defendant at a place other than the scene of the crime or
a witness who identifies a person other than the defendant as the
perpetrator of the offense. 40 Although cross-examination of the
prosecution's witnesses might reveal such information, allowing
an adversary proceeding to be held solely on the basis of such a
possibility could justify questioning witnesses who testify in any
capacity. This appears inconsistent with the express purpose of
the supreme court to avoid cross-examination in "most cases. '41
The Florence court also reasoned that simplifying the probable cause determination would reduce the expenditure of judicial time.42 But this rationale is unpersuasive as well. ReducFOR THE DEFENSE OF CRUVnNAL CASES § :[41 (3d ed.
INAL DEFENSE TEcHNIQuEs 8-8 (R. Cipes ed. 1969).

1974). See also CRIM-

37. The court stated that the function of the judge at the omnibus
hearing "does not extend to an assessment of the relative credibility of
conflicting testimony." 239 N.W.2d a 903. It is unclear whether the
court intended to preclude the judge from making any credibility deter-

minations, or only from resolving conflicts of testimony between wit-

nesses. If it intended to preclude only the latter, cross-examination of
a witness whose testimony was essential to the state's case would arguably be available, inasmuch as it could "exonerate" the defendant. If,
on the other hand, the court intended to preclude credibility determinations altogether, the omnibus hearing would invite governmental manipulations. Defendants could be subjected to public trial on the basis of
testimony by but one vindictive witness.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. State v. Axilrod, 248 Minn. 204, 79 N.W.2d 677 (1956).
40. 239 N.W.2d at 903. The court provided another example of a
witness who might exonerate the defendant: a witness to the offense
who describes it in terms demonstrating the absence of an essential element of the crime charged. Id.
41.

Id. at 899-900.

42. See id.
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ing the defendant's opportunity to assess the strength of the
case against him may discourage guilty pleas and result in
more public trials, thereby increasing the burden on the courts.
Experience in several jurisdictions demonstrates that genuinely
contested preliminary hearings result in more guilty pleas than
uncontested ones because defendants tend to become pessimistic
43
when actually faced with the case against them.
Because resort to discovery proceedings to accomplish effective cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses is foreclosed
both by the absence of liberal deposition provisions and the
incompatibility of vigorous pretrial questioning with the development of the defendant's case, the Florence court has deprived
defendants of the opportunity to test the strength of the evidence
against them prior to public trial. By limiting the probable cause
43. Note, supra note 9, at 794-95. The court also justified diminishing the role of the probable cause determination by drawing an analogy

to the federal procedure established in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that while
the fourth amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite for detention, it does not require an adversary hearing with confrontation and cross-examination. Id. at 120.
But Gerstein involved a hearing to determine whether a defendant
could be detained after arrest, not a hearing to determine whether a defendant should be bound over for trial. While the Florence court conceded that a distinction could be drawn between a hearing to test the
right to detain after arrest and a hearing to determine whether a defendant should stand trial, it asserted that the difference was one of degree
only. 239 N.W.2d at 902. This reasoning fails to address, indeed it
merely restates, the question whether the distinction is sufficient to justify greater protection for the defendant in the later proceeding. Had
the court, in calculating the significance of this "degree," considered the
fact that the hearing to detain for arrest evaluated in Gerstein has traditionally been held ex parte and often informally to meet the exigencies
of law enforcement, it may have concluded that Gerstein was not useful
authority. The hearing to determine whether the accused should be
bound over for trial has traditionally served entirely different purposes,
never requiring rapid disposition. In Gerstein the Supreme Court itself
distinguished the hearing to detain from the later hearing to determine
whether the defendant should be bound over for trial:
Once the suspect is in custody... the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There
no longer is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit
further crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary action
subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention [e.g., from the date of the omnibus hearing to
the date set for trial] may be more serious than the interference
occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships.

420 U.S. at 114.
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determination to an ex parte examination of the complaint and its
attachments and by denying the accused any opportunity to call
attention to weaknesses in the prosecution's case, the court has
precluded the probable cause hearing from accomplishing the objectives that the court implied are still valid.44 Without ample
opportunity to thoroughly test the case against him with the use
of adversary procedures, including confrontation of witnesses
against him, the defendant may not, in most cases, have the opportunity to avoid the humiliation and anxiety of an unjustified
public prosecution. Moreover, both the defendant and the state
may undertake the expense of public trials needlessly. In the
absence of an alternative procedure to screen groundless charges,
conditioning the right to cross-examination on the fortuity of
producing a witness who, if believed, would exonerate the
defendant is entirely arbitrary. Without sufficient evidence to
support the assertion by the court that eliminating adversary
proceedings in most cases will result in a savings of judicial time
and expense, such arbitrariness is without justification. And even
were such evidence forthcoming, it is by no means clear that
judicial economy should displace the avoidance of public prosecutions for improperly charged defendants as the paramount
objective of pretrial criminal procedure.

44. 239 N.W.2d at 896. Of the functions the supreme court listed
that may be served by the probable cause hearing-including securing
the release of a person illegally detained, avoiding the expense and
ignominy of prosecution, uncovering groundless prosecutions, assessing
the credibility of prosecution witnesses, compelling witnesses to appear
to be recorded, and enabling the defendant to engage in a form of discovery-it discounted only discovery as capable of accomplishment outside of the hearing. Id. at 898; see note 25 supra and accompanying
text,

